Democrats, Republicans, and Taxes: Evidence that Political Parties Matter by Reed, W.R.
 
 
 
 
 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics (2005) 
 
DEMOCRATS, REPUBLICANS, AND TAXES: 
EVIDENCE THAT POLITICAL PARTIES MATTER 
 
 
by 
 
W. Robert Reed* 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I estimate the influence of political parties on state Tax Burdens over a forty-year period 
(1960-2000).  Holding constant a large number of state and voter characteristic variables, 
I find that: (i) Tax Burdens are higher when Democrats control the state legislature 
compared to when Republicans are in control.  (ii) The political party of the governor has 
little effect after controlling for partisan influences in the state legislature.  I explain how 
both findings are consistent with median voter theory.  My results suggest that after five 
years of Democratic control of the legislature, state government would be approximately 
3 to 5 percent larger than if Republicans controlled the legislature during that same 
period, with the better specifications producing estimates in the higher end of this range. 
 
 
JEL Classifications: H1, H2 
 
 
 
 
Revised, December 16, 2004 
 
 
 
* Professor, Department of Economics, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, 73019; 
breed@ou.edu; http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/R/William.R.Reed-1.  I thank Jim Alt, Kevin 
Grier, Jim Poterba, and Dan Sutter for helpful comments; and Kodrat Wibowo for able 
research assistance. 
 1
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Conventional wisdom (or at least Republican campaign propaganda!) holds that 
Democrats are more likely to raise taxes than Republicans.  Surprisingly, this claim has 
not often been put to the test.  This study exploits the rich variety of experiences at the 
state level to determine if political party variables affect taxes. 
The few studies that have previously examined this issue reach different 
conclusions.  Poterba (1994) finds no difference in how the political parties respond to 
unexpected budget deficits.  Besley and Case (1995a) report that, generally, the 
governor’s political party is not significantly related to the level of total taxes.  However, 
states with Democratic governors in their last terms have higher taxes.  Their analysis 
does not include legislative branch variables.  Alt and Lowery (2000) estimate that tax 
revenues are higher when Democrats control the state budgetary process.  Caplan (2001) 
finds that taxes increase with the percent Democratic representation in either of the 
state’s legislative chambers.  However, there is no evidence that taxes are higher when 
Democrats are in control of the legislative chambers.  His analysis does not include 
executive branch variables.   
My study is motivated by a desire to better understand the influence of political 
parties on taxes.  But there are wider applications.  The question of whether political 
parties “matter” supports a long-standing debate in the political science and political 
economy literatures.  A small sampling from this literature includes Winters (1976); 
Garand (1988); Blais, Blake and Dion (1993); Krehbiel (1993), Imbeau, Pétry and 
Lamari (2001); Besley and Case (2003); and Per Pettersson-Lidbom (2003).  Central to 
this debate is the extent to which political parties deviate from the median voter in a two-
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party system.1  This analysis contributes to that debate by providing evidence that 
political parties can exert a significant, independent effect on policy outcomes even when 
politicians faithfully represent their respective median voters.  
A completely different application has to do with econometric analyses concerned 
with policy endogeneity.  Besley and Case (2000) demonstrate that the fraction of women 
in state upper and lower houses can serve as an instrument for endogenous state policies 
when estimating the impact of those policies. The results of my study suggest that party 
control of the legislature may also be an effective instrument.  
This paper proceeds as follows:  Section II presents specification, data, and 
estimation issues.  Section III reports the empirical results.  Section IV summarizes the 
main findings.  
 
II.  SPECIFICATION, DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
 
While the desire to generate a given level of total revenues may motivate tax policy, as a 
practical matter revenues lie beyond policy-makers’ direct control.  Instead, policy-
makers influence taxes through legislation that sets rate parameters and defines the tax 
base, among other things.   
 A commonly used measure of state tax policy is “Tax Burden,” which is the ratio 
of total state and local tax revenues to state Personal Income.2  Tax Burden provides a 
convenient summary measure of diverse and complex tax systems with non-uniform rate 
structures and multiple tax bases.3,4  It is closely monitored by many prominent 
                                                 
1  Bender and Lott (1996) provide a survey of the principal-agent literature in political markets. 
2 We follow Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) in assuming that state fiscal policy is reflected in both state 
and local tax revenues, rather than just state tax revenues. 
3 Benson and Johnson (1986, p. 392, FN7) note that calculating statutory tax rates that were comparable 
across states would be an enormous task and one “frothing” with errors. 
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organizations, including the Federation of Tax Administrators, the National Conference 
of State Legislatures, the National Tax Association, and the Tax Foundation.  Further, it 
has been used in numerous empirical studies of taxes, including Dye (1980), Helms 
(1985), Benson and Johnson (1986), Canto and Webb (1987), Mofidi and Stone (1990), 
Yu, Wallace, and Nardinelli (1991), Mullen and Williams (1994), Carroll and Wasylenko 
(1994), Knight (2000), Yamarik (2000, 2004), and Caplan (2001).5   
 My sample consists of state-level Tax Burden data from 1960-2000.  I follow the 
examples of Poterba (1994) and Alt and Lowery (2000) by focusing on changes in taxes.  
In particular, I look to the change in a state’s Tax Burden, stBurden Tax Δ  = 
( )1-ts,st Burden TaxBurden Tax − , for evidence of political party influence on taxes.6    
 Further, I model my analysis after the economic growth literature by aggregating 
data into five-year periods (cf. Grier and Tullock, 1989).7  Institutional and political 
barriers make it difficult for policy-makers to immediately implement their policy 
preferences.  As a result, the real-time mapping from political party control to tax 
revenues may be different across states and time periods in ways that are difficult to 
formally specify.  The advantage of aggregation is that it allows one to avoid having to 
explicitly model complex lag effects.  This can reduce the likelihood of making 
specification errors, and increase the likelihood of identifying political party effects if 
                                                                                                                                                 
4  Nelson (2000) provides an example of a conscientious attempt to use changes in statutory rates to 
measure state tax policy.  However, he acknowledges that “tax legislation pertaining to the definition of a 
tax base … and tax credits are not considered” (page 542f.)  Further, he is only able to characterize tax 
rate changes within – but not across – revenue categories (e.g., individual income tax, corporate income 
tax, sales tax, etc.) “with no distinction given to the magnitude of the rate change” (page 543). 
5  Reed and Rogers (2004) compare changes in Tax Burdens with revenue estimates associated with 
recently adopted state tax legislation.  They find that “changes in Tax Burden are positively and 
significantly related to changes in state tax policy” (page 2). 
6 I adopt the usual practice of defining a state’s Tax Burden at time t as the ratio of that state’s tax 
revenues in fiscal year t over its Personal Income in calendar year t-1. 
7 I demonstrate in the Appendix that the use of annual data produces larger estimates of partisan control 
effects.  The corresponding hypothesis tests are unaffected. 
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they exist in the data.  For these reasons, the focus variable in my study is the Five-Year 
Change in Tax Burdenst , 
(1) Five-Year Change in Tax Burdenst ∑
=
+≡
5
1i
5-its,Burden Tax  Δ    
                                                        ( )5-ts,st Burden TaxBurden Tax −≡ .  
Political party variables.  Poterba (1994) and Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) note 
that fiscal policies legislated in one year typically do not take effect until the next fiscal 
year.  Hence policy preferences of the party in power will first be reflected in the next 
fiscal year’s revenues and expenditures.  This study incorporates their insight by 
modeling the observed change in Tax Burden at time t as a function of political party 
variables observed at time t-1, ( )1-ts,st XfBurden Tax =Δ .  
 Like Poterba (1994 and 1995), Alt and Lowery (1994 and 2000), and Gilligan and 
Matsusaka (1995), I model partisan political influences via control of the legislative and 
executive branches.  Democratic Legislature measures the percentage of years during the 
5-year period that Democrats controlled both chambers of the state legislature.  
Republican Legislature does the same for Republicans.  The respective mean values of 
these variables for my sample are 56.39 and 24.61 percent.8  In other words, during a 
typical 5-year period in my sample, Democrats controlled both chambers of the 
legislature a little more than half the time.  Republicans controlled both chambers about a 
fourth of the time.  Note that the two variables do not sum to 100 percent.  The omitted 
category represents those years in which control of the state legislature was split between 
the two parties.   
                                                 
8 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study are reported in TABLE I. 
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 Democratic Governor measures the percentage of years during the 5-year period 
that the state had a Democratic governor.  The mean value of this variable for my sample 
is 56.83 percent.  Given the rarity of a third-party governor, the omitted category can be 
interpreted as those years for which the state had a Republican governor.  In addition to 
including this as an independent political party variable, I also interact partisan control of 
the executive branch with that of the legislative branch.  This enables me to explore 
alternative avenues by which political parties influence taxes. 
 All political variables represent averages over the respective five-year period 
lagged by one year.  In other words, to explain the sum of Tax Burden changes 
4-ts,Burden Tax Δ  through stBurden Tax Δ  (cf. Equation [1]), I use political variables 
observed during the time period t-5 to t-1.  I do this to be consistent with the fact that tax 
legislation enacted in one fiscal year typically does not go into effect until the next fiscal 
year.  
 State and voter characteristic variables.  Omitted variable bias is a potential 
problem in any analysis that attempts to attribute policy outcomes to political 
representation variables.  In light of this, my study employs a large number of state and 
voter characteristic variables.  The variable ADA Average measures the average 
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score of the state’s federal legislators.9  To 
construct this variable, I add the mean, annual ADA score for the state’s U.S. House 
representatives to the mean, annual ADA score for the state’s two U.S. senators, and 
divide by two.  This provides an average ADA score for that state’s federal legislators in 
any given year.  As in the case of the political party variables, I use the average value for 
                                                 
9 I use the “Inflation-Adjusted ADA Scores” calculated by Tim Groseclose and accessible for download at 
the website: “faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/groseclose/homepage.htm”. 
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this variable over the respective five-year period, lagged by one year.  If voters’ policy 
preferences influence state tax policy, one would expect that they would also influence 
the public policy of that state’s federal legislators.  By including a measure of the latter, I 
aim to hold this influence constant.   
 A commonly employed variable for proxying voters’ preferences towards public 
goods is income.  As a measure of income, I use the log of real Per Capita Personal 
Income (PCPI), measured in 1983-84 constant dollars.  Wagner’s Law predicts that a 
state’s Tax Burden will rise as its income rises.  On the other hand, states tend to raise 
taxes during economic downturns and cut taxes during times of economic prosperity, 
suggesting an inverse relationship between state income and Tax Burden.  The net effect 
is theoretically ambiguous. 
 I also include a relatively large number of state demographic variables.  Percent 
Elderly measures the share of a state’s population aged 65 and over.10  Percent Black and 
Percent Female measure the corresponding share of the black and female populations.  
Percent College-Educated is defined as the fraction of the population aged 25 years old 
and above who have completed college or a higher degree program.  Percent Union is the 
percent of nonagricultural wage and salary employees who are union members.  
Population Density is the ratio of population to land area.  Farm Share and 
Manufacturing Share measure the percent of the state’s Personal Income attributed to the 
farm and manufacturing sectors.   
 I do not have strong priors about the effects of these “taste” variables.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that populations that are older, more educated, and more 
                                                 
10 The importance of demographic variables, and particularly, the share of the population that is elderly, is 
demonstrated by Poterba (1997). 
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agriculturally based will prefer lower taxes.  Populations that are more urban, unionized, 
and contain greater proportions of women and blacks are usually assumed to prefer 
higher taxes (and spending).  I have no prior expectations about the sign of 
Manufacturing Share.  Most of these variables have not been included in previous studies 
of state taxes.   
Like ADA Average, all these state and voter characteristic variables are measured 
by their average value over the respective five-year period, lagged by one year.  An 
econometric concern in this analysis is that income, and perhaps the other state 
characteristic variables, are characterized by endogeneity.  This possibility will be 
investigated below.  
Initial Tax Burden.  According to Besley and Case (1995b), political agents are 
constrained in their tax-setting behavior by “yardstick competition.” Specifically, 
politicians in states with relatively high Tax Burdens will face greater electoral costs 
when raising taxes compared to politicians from states with relatively low Tax Burdens.  
To control for this phenomenon, I include the value of the state’s Tax Burden at the 
beginning of the respective five-year period (Initial Tax Burdenst = 5-ts,Burden Tax ).   
 State and time fixed effects.  If one constructs a national “Tax Burden” variable 
defined by the total of all state and local tax revenues divided by national Personal 
Income, three “cycles” become evident in the time series: (i) a sharply rising Tax Burden 
from 1960-1973, (ii) a sharply falling Tax Burden from 1973-1983, and (iii) a gradually 
increasing Tax Burden from 1983-2000.11  For that reason, I include time fixed effects to 
                                                 
11 The Appendix contains a figure showing the cyclical behavior of this national “Tax Burden” variable 
over time. 
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control for the influence of time-varying variables not included in the model.  State fixed 
effects are added to pick up the influence of omitted (time-invariant) state characteristics.   
Sample.  My sample consists of forty years of observations (1960-2000) from 45 
states.  I follow convention by deleting Alaska and Hawaii.  I also exclude Nebraska, 
Minnesota, and Wyoming.  Nebraska is excluded because state representatives do not 
formally affiliate with political parties.  Minnesota is excluded because it had a 
unicameral state legislature through 1970.  Finally, Wyoming is omitted because of 
peculiarities in the composition of its Tax Burden variable.12   
 Specification of the regression equation.  The previous analysis suggests an 
empirical strategy consisting of the following elements: (i) aggregating state-level 
observations into five-year periods; (ii) using the change in state Tax Burden as the 
dependent variable; and (iii) including measures of political variables, state and voter 
characteristic variables, “yardstick competition,” and state and time fixed effects as 
explanatory variables.  This leads to the following specification of the regression 
equation:  
 ( )5-ts,stst Burden TaxBurden TaxBurden Tax in Change Year-Five −=  
(2)        ∑∑ ++=
j
stj,j
i
sti,i Variable sticCharacteri  StateVariableParty  Political γβα  
       stst Effects Fixed TimeEffects Fixed StateBurden Tax Initial     εδ ++++  , 
where t = 1965,1970, … ,2000. 
 
                                                 
12  Wyoming’s Tax Burden time series displays a dramatic increase in the late 1970s through mid-1980s.  
My research determined that this was not the result of changes in the state’s tax code.  Rather, it was 
primarily the product of a heavy reliance on severance taxes combined with an extended oil boom during 
this period.  Accordingly, I eliminate this state to prevent this extraordinary increase in Tax Burden from 
skewing the results.  I also investigated Tax Burden time series from other states for which severance 
taxes comprised an important component of overall state tax revenue (e.g. Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana).  
I did not find these other cases problematic.  Time series graphs of Tax Burdens from individual states 
can be viewed at “http:/faculty-staff.ou.edu/R/Cynthia.Rogers-1/TAX/TAXBURDEN.htm”. 
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In order to facilitate interpretation of my results, I recast this equation in terms of levels 
as follows:  
 ∑+=
i
sti,ist VariableParty  Political   Burden Tax βα  
(3)                         st
j
stj,j Burden Tax Initial Variable sticCharacteri  State δγ ~++∑  
                     stEffects Fixed TimeEffects Fixed State    ε+++  , 
where t = 1965,1970, … ,2000 and ( )δδ += 1~ .   
 The subsequent empirical analysis relies on Equation (3) for the general 
specification of the regression equations.  I assume that the error term is independently 
distributed but possibly heteroscedastic.  I initially estimate the model using OLS and 
employ White’s heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix for the purposes of 
hypothesis testing.  I then test for endogeneity and reestimate my main equations using 
2SLS.  Descriptive statistics for all the variables are presented in TABLE I. 
  
III.  RESULTS 
 
The estimated effect of partisan control of the legislative branch.  TABLE II presents 
results from four different OLS regressions having the general specification of Equation 
(3) above.  These equations share a core set of variables, to which additional variables are 
included in each subsequent equation.  Given the concern with omitted variable bias, I am 
interested in studying how the addition of control variables affects the partisan control 
coefficients.   
Equation (A) consists of a constant and the two partisan control variables, 
Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature.  Obviously, this equation is 
woefully underspecified (the associated R2 value is 0.066).  Its usefulness lies in being a 
benchmark for subsequent equations, and in illustrating the importance of omitted 
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variable bias.  The coefficients for the partisan control variables are large and statistically 
significant.  Each of these coefficients estimates the effect of the respective political party 
controlling both chambers of the legislature against the alternative of split control.   
For example, the Democratic Legislature coefficient of -0.01010 estimates that 
Democratic control of both chambers of the legislature for a period of five consecutive 
years would result in a Tax Burden that was 1.01 percentage points lower at the end of 
that period, compared to the case where legislative control was split.  As shall be shortly 
demonstrated, this puzzling result arises from failure to control for the influence of other 
variables.  
Equation (B) improves upon the specification by adding state and voter 
characteristic variables, along with Initial Tax Burden.  This specification “explains” 
approximately 70 percent of the variation in state Tax Burdens.  The state and voter 
characteristic variables generally have the expected signs and are jointly highly 
significant.13  Further, states with high initial Tax Burdens are estimated to have had 
higher Tax Burdens five years later.  The estimated Initial Tax Burden coefficient of 0.77 
is highly significant and less than one.  This latter finding suggests convergence in Tax 
Burdens, consistent with the “yardstick competition” hypothesis of Besley and Case 
(1995b).   
Adding these control variables reduces the size of the political party variables by 
roughly an order of magnitude.  The Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature 
coefficients are now each statistically insignificant.  Further, I cannot reject the 
hypothesis that there is no difference between Democrats and Republicans when it comes 
                                                 
13 A test of the hypothesis that the coefficients for each of the 10 state and voter characteristic variables is 
equal to zero is rejected with a corresponding p-value of 0.000 (cf. “Hypothesis Test” for “State and 
Voter Characteristic Variables” at the bottom of TABLE II). 
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to how control of the legislature affects a state’s Tax Burden:  the hypothesis 
eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ =  fails to be rejected way above the 5-percent 
significance level (the p-level is 0.436).  A comparison of Equations (A) and (B) 
highlights the importance of including appropriate controls when estimating the influence 
of political party variables. 
Equation (C) improves upon the specification by adding state and time fixed 
effects.14  While not reported in the table, the state and time fixed effects are each jointly 
significant at the 0.001 significance level.  Indeed, this will continue to be the case for all 
subsequent specifications including these effects.  The primary consequence of adding 
these additional controls is to increase the Democratic Legislature coefficient from -
0.00145 to 0.00358.  The Democratic Legislature coefficient is now statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level (the t-statistic is 2.58).  The Republican Legislature 
remains insignificant.  A test of the hypothesis eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ =  is now 
rejected.   
Because they are based solely on “within group” differences, the partisan control 
coefficients in Equation (C) can now be directly interpreted as the effect of a change in 
control of a given state’s legislature.  Taken together, these results indicate that taxes are 
likely to increase when Democrats control both chambers of the state legislature.  In 
contrast, there is little difference between Republican and split control of the legislature. 
I next experiment with a number of alternative specifications in order to minimize 
omitted variable bias.  I find that the addition of quadratic terms does not significantly 
                                                 
14 A test of fixed effects versus random effects soundly rejects the hypothesis of random effects (the 
associated p-value is 0.000). 
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improve the fit of the equation; whereas, the addition of time-varying coefficients does.15  
There are thirteen explanatory variables in the specification of Equation (C), not counting 
state and time fixed effects.  Allowing all possible subsets of these thirteen variables to 
have time-varying coefficients produces a total of 8191 possible combinations.16  I 
estimate all 8191 of these specifications and report the “best” specification as determined 
by lowest AIC value in Equation (D) of TABLE II. 
The specification with the lowest AIC value includes interactive time effects for 
the following four variables: Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Initial 
Tax Burden.  Since each of these four variables is multiplied by seven separate time-
period dummy variables, a total of twenty-eight time interaction terms are included in 
Equation (D). 
Equation (D) represents an improvement over Equation (C) in terms of 
explanatory power.  The R2 increases from 0.856 to 0.890 and the AIC decreases from 
1.702 to 1.591.  Further, the set of twenty-eight interaction effects is jointly significant at 
well below the 1 percent level.   
 The inclusion of these additional control variables serves to marginally increase 
the Democratic Legislature coefficient and marginally decrease the Republican 
Legislature coefficient.  The Republican Legislature coefficient is now negative, but 
remains insignificant.  The hypothesis of no difference between the two 
                                                 
15 There are a number of reasons why one might expect this result.  The political effectiveness of labor 
unions could change over time, inducing time-varying behavior in the Percent Union coefficient.  
Further, if greater polarity in the urban and rural electorate has occurred over time, as suggested by some, 
then variables such as Population Density and Farm Share could have time-varying effects.  Finally, 
taxes may resonate as a campaign issue to a greater or lesser degree at different points in time according 
to the mood of the electorate, resulting in differing rates of “tax convergence.”  This would cause the 
coefficient on Initial Tax Burden to change over time.  In any case, given the forty-year length of my 
sample, it seems reasonable to generalize Equation (C) to allow the coefficients to be time-varying.   
16 This calculation assumes that interaction effects are not introduced piecemeal, for only some time 
periods, but for all time periods. 
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parties, eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic0 ββ  :H = , continues to be rejected, this time with an 
associated p-value of 0.002.   
What about the concern that political party variables are merely proxying for 
voters’ preferences; i.e., the omitted variable bias problem?  There are three reasons why 
omitted variable bias is less likely to affect my estimates compared to previous studies.  
First, I include a larger variety of state and voter characteristic variables than any other 
study of partisan influences on taxes.  Second, as more controls for state and voter 
characteristic variables are added to the model (i.e., as one moves from Equation [B] to 
Equation [D] in TABLE II) the party differences become more, not less, pronounced.  
Finally, my best specification (Equation [D]) “explains” approximately 90 percent of the 
variation in the level of state Tax Burdens.  This reduces the scope for omitted variables 
to bias the sign of the political party variables.  This provides some confidence that the 
inclusion of additional state and voter characteristic variables will not substantially alter 
my finding of significant party differences.   
Addressing endogeneity in the data.  One concern that I have not yet addressed is 
endogeneity, particularly with respect to the relationship between income and taxes.  
There is a large literature that assumes that the direction of causation runs from taxes to 
income.17  
Indeed, a case can be made that taxes may also affect other state and voter 
characteristic variables:  Elderly citizens may choose to migrate out of states with high 
Tax Burdens.  On the other hand, high-tax states may be particularly appealing to certain 
socio-economic groups because these states may be relatively generous in funding public 
                                                 
17 Wasylenko (1997) provides a survey of this literature.   
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programs.  The associated programs may be disproportionately appealing (or 
unappealing) to certain groups, who may migrate in or out in response (i.e., the Tiebout 
hypothesis).  Taxes may also disproportionately affect different industries within a state.  
Accordingly, the following variables are suspected to be endogenous:  Log of Real PCPI, 
Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent College-Educated, Percent 
Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share.18 
To address this concern, I choose as instruments the initial value of these 
variables at the beginning of the respective five-year period.  In other words, to 
instrument the average value of state and voter characteristic variables calculated over the 
time period t-5 to t-1, I use the value of these variables at time t-5.  These instruments are 
(i) highly correlated with the respective five-year average values, and (ii) expected to be 
independent of subsequent tax changes.   
Application of the Hausman test to Equation (C) produces strong evidence of 
endogeneity:  A Hausman test of the endogeneity of Log of Real PCPI strongly rejects 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity.  A Hausman test of the joint endogeneity of the 
variables Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent 
College-Educated, Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing 
Share is also strongly rejected.19  These tests provide evidence that instrumental variable 
regression is warranted.   
Equation (E) in TABLE III reports the results of reestimating Equation (C) from 
TABLE II using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).  If higher taxes decrease state 
                                                 
18  I assume that the political control variables (Democratic Legislature, Republican Legislature, and the 
governorship variables) are exogenous with respect to changes in tax rates.  While increases in tax rates 
are widely presumed to decrease the probability of reelection for incumbent politicians, there is no reason 
to believe that this electoral cost is different across the political parties. 
19  The associated p-values are 0.0001 and 0.0004, respectively. 
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incomes, the associated endogeneity would be expected to negatively bias the coefficient 
on Log of Real PCPI in Equation (C).  The fact that the coefficient for Log of Real PCPI 
becomes positive in Equation (E), though it remains insignificant, is consistent with the 
removal of this bias.  
A comparison of the other coefficients shows little substantive difference with 
respect to estimates of the influence of partisan control.  The hypothesis test, 
Ho: eLegislatur Democraticβ eLegislatur Republicanβ= , continues to be rejected, with a p-value of 0.012.  
Equation (F) repeats the exercise, reestimating Equation (D) in TABLE II using 2SLS.  
Again, the hypothesis is rejected with a p-value of 0.001.   
Taken together, these results provide strong evidence that when it comes to taxes, 
it makes a difference which party controls the state legislature.  The next section explores 
the influence of the governorship on taxes. 
 The estimated effect of partisan control of the executive branch.  The top half of 
TABLE IV reports the results of adding the variable Democratic Governor to Equations 
(C) and (D) (from TABLE II), and to Equations (E) and (F) (from TABLE III).  I report 
the estimated coefficients for the Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature 
variables along with the gubernatorial variable, but do not report other coefficients for 
brevity’s sake.  The results provide no evidence that partisan control of the executive 
branch matters for state tax policy.  The coefficient for Democratic Governor does not 
achieve significance in any of the equations. 
 The bottom half of TABLE IV reports an alternative specification in which I 
distinguish five partisan control configurations:  
1. Democrats control the legislature and the governorship 
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2. Democrats control the legislature 
3. split control of the legislature 
4. Republicans control the legislature 
5. Republicans control the legislature and the governorship 
If partisan control of the executive branch matters, I expect to see a greater effect when 
the same party controls both branches of state government than when it only controls the 
legislative branch.  However, the interactive effects (Democratic Governor AND 
Democratic Legislature and Republican Governor AND Republican Legislature) are 
usually wrong-signed and never significant, neither individually nor jointly:  Across the 
four specifications, the p-values for the null hypothesis that both gubernatorial 
coefficients are equal to zero are 0.471, 0.934, 0.335, and 0.911, respectively. 
 Reconciling the estimates of party control of the governorship and party control of 
the legislature with median voter theory.  Why would party control of the governorship 
not affect state tax policy, while party control of the legislature does?  A straightforward 
explanation is provided by median voter theory.  A governor’s constituents consist of all 
the voters in that state.  Thus, Democratic and Republican governors face the same 
median voter.  This limits the ability of governors to implement their personal tax 
agendas.20  It forces Democratic and Republican governors to behave similarly. 
 In contrast, members of the state legislature represent different districts.  The 
median voter in Democratic districts is likely to have very different preferences than the 
median voter in Republican districts.  As a result, Democratic leaders in the state 
legislature face different median voters than Republican leaders in the state legislature.  
                                                 
20  Besley and Case (1995a) present evidence that governors who deviate from the preferences of the 
median voter will be punished in the next election.   
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When control switches from one party to the other, there is not the same electoral 
pressure to compel Democratic and Republican legislative leaders to behave similarly.  
Rather than being unexpected, my results are precisely what one would expect from a 
straightforward application of median voter theory. 
 The different implications for median voter theory with respect to political party 
influence on the legislative and executive branches has been conjectured--but not 
empirically demonstrated--in previous studies.  Douglas Holtz-Eakin (1988, p. 272) 
writes:  
Each representative in the state legislature will reflect the preferences of 
the median voter of his or her district.  The state legislative process will 
consist of the ‘votes’ (by proxy) of each local median voter.  If the 
legislature votes as a single body on spending proposals the bill which 
passes will be favored by the median point in the distribution of median 
voters across the jurisdictions.  The governor, in contrast, will reflect the 
tastes of the median voter in the statewide distribution of all voters. 
 
This insight also underlies Crain’s study on the importance of diversity in 
legislative districts (Crain, 1999).  If this interpretation of my empirical results is correct, 
it suggests that party control of the state legislature may be a useful instrumental variable 
in studies of state public policy.  I discuss this further below. 
The quantitative importance of partisan control of the legislature.  Consider the 
following two scenarios.  In the first scenario, Republicans control the state legislature 
for all five years of a given five-year period.  In the second scenario, Democrats control 
the state legislature during the same time period.  The difference between the coefficients 
for Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature provides an estimate of the 
impact of this switch in party control on a state’s Tax Burden.   
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 The respective estimated differences in Equations (C) through (F) are 0.00315, 
0.00450, 0.00382, and 0.00524.  In words, these estimates indicate that the switch from 
Republican to Democratic control would cause state Tax Burdens to increase 0.315 to 
0.524 percentage points.21  As a point of reference, I note that the average Five-Year 
Change in Tax Burden for my sample is 0.19 percentage points, and the standard 
deviation is 0.79 percentage points.  Thus, the estimated partisan control effects are 
approximately twice the size of the average five-year change in Tax Burden and half the 
standard deviation.  Further, the estimated effects are larger for Equations (D) and (F), 
the two “best” specifications based on goodness-of-fit measures, with the latter being 
preferred to the extent that the corresponding 2SLS estimates improve upon OLS. 
 The quantitative importance of these estimates can perhaps be better gauged if the 
effects are recast in terms of the overall size of government.  Let G represent the size of 
government as measured by state and local expenditures as a share of state Personal 
Income.  Let T represent the Tax Burden.  As a first approximation, I assume that each 
state’s total expenditures as a share of Personal Income is a constant multiple of its Tax 
Burden, so that stsst TkG ⋅= .  If I evaluate G at the mean value of Initial Tax Burden 
(10.534, cf. TABLE I), the corresponding estimates indicate that after five years of 
Democratic control of the legislature, government would be roughly 3 to 5 percent 
“larger” at the state and local level than if the state legislature were controlled by 
                                                 
21 The respective differences are multiplied by 100 because a complete switch for five years implies that the 
values of the Republican Legislature and Democratic Legislature variables change by 100. 
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Republicans during that same period.22   The “better” specifications of Equations (D) and 
(F) produce estimates of 4.2 and 4.9 percent, respectively.   
 However, the effect from this five-year change in control would dissipate over 
time.  The coefficients for Initial Tax Burden in Equations (C) through (F) range between 
0.43 and 0.47.  This implied “tax convergence” suggests that more than half of the 
Democratic-produced increase in Tax Burden would dissipate five years later; about 
eighty percent of the original effect would be gone ten years later.  Of course, if 
Democrats continued in control of the legislature for subsequent five-year periods, the 
associated increases in the size of state and local government would accumulate over 
time.   
 Why have many previous studies failed to find significant political party effects?  
My results indicate that partisan control of state legislatures has an important influence 
on taxes and, correspondingly, on the size of state and local government.  In fact, given 
its substantial size, one wonders why many previous studies have not found evidence of 
this effect.  TABLE V identifies two reasons:  failure to control for (i) the lag between 
legislation and observed tax revenues, and (ii) time-varying behavior in the Tax Burden 
time series.   
 As discussed in the text (cf. Section II, “State and Voter Characteristic 
Variables”), tax legislation passed in one year does not get reflected in revenues until, at 
least, the next fiscal year.  Failure to control for this lag can result in statistically 
insignificant political party effects.  Column (1) of TABLE V reports the results of 
estimating a specification similar to Equation (C) in TABLE II, except that the lagged 
                                                 
22  The effects are calculated by 
( )
100
10.534k
Burden Tax in Change Estimated10.534k
ln
s
s ⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⋅
+⋅
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values of the state and voter characteristic variables are replaced by current values.  
Using this latter specification, a test of differences in the party control coefficients fails to 
be rejected.  The corresponding p-value is 0.905.  In other words, had I not controlled for 
the lagged effects of state and voter characteristic variables, I would have failed to 
estimate a significant partisan control effect.  Note that the higher AIC value of Column 
(1) relative to that of Equation (C) in TABLE II indicates that the use of current values is 
inferior to that of lagged values.  This highlights the importance of appropriately 
controlling for the lag between legislation and revenues. 
 The last two columns of TABLE V demonstrate what happens when time-varying 
behavior in the TAX BURDEN time series is not appropriately controlled.  As discussed 
in the text (cf. Section II, “State and Time Fixed Effects”), state Tax Burdens exhibited 
strong cyclical behavior over the sample period.  Therefore, it is important to control for 
the effect of omitted, time-varying variables.  This is especially true when the 
specification includes state fixed effects, and changes in partisan control of the legislature 
occur unevenly over time and across states. 
Column (2) of TABLE V reports the results of estimating an equation with a 
specification similar to Equation (C) of TABLE II, except no time fixed effects are 
included.  In sharp contrast to the specification with time fixed effects, the null 
hypothesis, eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic0 ββ:H = , fails to be rejected (p-value = 0.822).  
Column (3) reports what happens when a linear time trend variable is used instead of the 
time fixed effects.  Again, the null hypothesis fails to be rejected (p-value = 0.965).  A 
comparison of the AIC values in Column (2) and (3) with their counterpart in Equation 
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(C) in TABLE II clearly demonstrates the inferiority of these specifications compared to 
one including time fixed effects.   
In conclusion, the results of TABLE V demonstrate the importance of controlling 
for (i) the lag between legislation and observed tax revenues, and (ii) time-varying 
behavior in the Tax Burden time series.  When these two factors are not appropriately 
controlled in empirical studies, the influence of political party variables can be missed.  
These results, as well as an examination of the influence of other factors, are presented in 
greater detail in the Appendix. 
On the Use of Partisan Control Variables as Instruments in State Policy Studies.  
Besley and Case (2000) argue that studies of state policies are likely to suffer from 
endogeneity.  This creates a demand for effective instrumental variables.  In order to be a 
good instrument, a variable should be highly correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable, but uncorrelated with the error term.  As discussed in the Appendix, my results 
indicate that party control of the state legislature has the requisite characteristics to serve 
as an effective instrumental variable when estimating the impact of public policies. 
 
IV.  SUMMARY 
This study finds evidence that political parties significantly impact state tax policy.  My 
two main results are:  (i) Tax Burdens are higher when Democrats control the state 
legislature compared to when Republicans are in control.  (ii) The political party of the 
governor has little effect after controlling for partisan influences in the legislature.    
I reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings of partisan influence using 
median voter theory.  Governors face a statewide electorate.  In order to be elected, both 
Republican and Democratic governors need to satisfy the same median voter.  This 
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constrains their ability to deviate from the median voter’s policy ideal.  In contrast, 
legislative leaders need to satisfy the median voter in their respective districts.  Since 
Democratic and Republican legislators serve different districts and, hence, different 
median voters, public policies will differ depending on which party controls the state 
legislature. 
The quantitative importance of party control of the legislature is substantial both 
from the perspective of size of Tax Burden and size of state and local government.  I 
estimate that a state’s Tax Burden would be 0.315 to 0.524 percentage points higher at 
the end of a five-year period if Democrats rather than Republicans controlled the 
legislature.  Stated differently, these estimates indicate that state and local government 
would be approximately 3 to 5 percent larger if Democrats rather than Republicans were 
in control of the legislature for a period of five years.  The better specifications produce 
estimates at the higher end of these ranges. 
These results have implications for econometric analyses that measure the impact 
of public policies on various economic outcomes.  As emphasized by Besley and Case 
(2000), a serious econometric concern is the endogeneity of public policies.  Failure to 
address this problem will result in inconsistent estimates of policy impacts.  My findings 
suggest that political influence variables -- particularly variables that measure partisan 
control of state legislatures – can make effective instruments in analyses of the impact of 
state policies. 
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TABLE I 
Statistical Description of the Data 
 
Variablea Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Tax Burden 10.73 1.25 7.92 15.83 
Initial Tax Burden 10.53 1.34 7.15 15.83 
Democratic Legislature 56.39 45.61 0 100 
Republican Legislature 24.61 38.44 0 100 
Democratic Governor 56.83 41.26 0 100 
Democratic Governor AND  
Democratic Legislature 35.89 41.30 0 100 
Republican Governor AND 
Republican Legislature 14.22 29.78 0 100 
ADA Average 41.46 18.64 1.23 96.24 
Log of Real PCPI 2.424 0.274 1.525 3.099 
Percent Elderly 10.81 2.10 5.54 17.06 
Percent Black 10.03 9.42 0.18 40.18 
Percent Female 50.63 1.76 43.52 55.48 
Percent College-Educated 15.23 6.06 5.04 33.21 
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Variablea Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Percent Union 19.69 9.07 3.80 48.1 
Population Density 161.38 212.94 3.22 1034.24 
Farm Share 2.60 3.57 -0.03 25.01 
Manufacturing Share 16.57 7.24 2.97 35.86 
 
 
NOTE:  Variables are described in Section II of the text.   
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TABLE II 
OLS Estimation of the Determinants of State Tax Burdens: 1960-2000 
 
VARIABLESa Equation (A)b Equation (B)b Equation (C)b Equation (D)b,c 
Democratic Legislature -0.01010 (-4.19) 
-0.00145 
(-1.04) 
0.00334 
(2.58) 
0.00358 
(2.66) 
Republican Legislature -0.00701 (-2.37) 
-0.00042 
(-0.26) 
0.00019 
(0.13) 
-0.00092 
(-0.63) 
ADA Average ---- 0.00443 (1.53) 
-0.00212 
(-0.71) 
-0.00150 
(-0.49) 
Log of Real PCPI ---- -0.45305 (-1.24) 
-1.71889 
(-2.12) 
-0.82203 
(-0.88) 
Percent Elderly ---- -0.04792 (-2.40) 
-0.08151 
(-1.60) 
-0.07210 
(-1.31) 
Percent Black ---- -0.00651 (-1.19) 
-0.07660 
(-2.42) 
-0.05898 
(-1.71) 
Percent Female ---- 0.07789 (2.99) 
0.02633 
(1.42) 
0.04410 
(1.82) 
Percent College-Educated ---- -0.00570 (-0.33) 
-0.04890 
(-2.22) 
-0.04451 
(-1.87) 
Percent Union ---- 0.00568 (0.95) 
0.01742 
(1.10) 
-0.00065c 
(-0.04) 
Population Density ---- 0.00029 (1.25) 
0.00749 
(4.15) 
0.00175c 
(0.56) 
Farm Share ---- -0.02670 (-1.30) 
-0.07180 
(-2.65) 
-0.02816c 
(-1.03) 
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VARIABLESa Equation (A)b Equation (B)b Equation (C)b Equation (D)b,c 
Manufacturing Share ---- -0.01406 (-1.73) 
-0.09149 
(-4.25) 
-0.03345 
(-1.55) 
Initial Tax Burden ---- 0.77004 (19.14) 
0.43676 
(8.28) 
0.43102c 
(5.42) 
Other included variables: (1) Intercept (1) Intercept 
(1) plus 
(2) State and 
Time Fixed 
Effects 
(1), (2), plus 
(3) Interaction 
Effectsc 
Observationsd 360 360 360 360 
R2 
(Adjusted R2) 
0.066 
(0.061) 
0.702 
(0.691) 
0.856 
(0.825) 
0.890 
(0.852) 
AIC 3.227 2.146 1.702 1.591 
Hypothesis Tests:e 
    
Political Party Variablesf 
2χ = 2.960 
(0.085) 
2χ = 0.607 
(0.436) 
2χ = 4.783 
(0.029) 
2χ = 9.468 
(0.002) 
State and Voter Characteristic Variablesg ---- 
2χ = 44.267 
(0.000) 
2χ = 41.347 
(0.000) 
2χ = 173.569 
(0.000) 
Interaction Effectsh ---- ---- ---- 
2χ = 112.385 
(0.000) 
 
NOTES:   
a  Variables are described in Section II of the text.  Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in TABLE I. 
b  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  All hypothesis tests employ White’s heteroscedastic 
consistent covariance matrix in calculating sample statistics. 
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c  In Equation (D), the variables Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Initial Tax Burden are each interacted with the 7 
time period dummy variables, resulting in a total of 28 interaction effects.  Accordingly, the coefficient estimates and t-statistics 
reported in the table represent the effect of the respective variables in the omitted time period (1960-1965).  Hypothesis tests of the 
joint significance of the respective variables over all the time periods produced the following results: (i) Percent Union (F=1.670, p-
value=0.106), (ii) Population Density (F=4.719, p-value=0.000), (iii) Farm Share (F=7.303, p-value=0.000), and (iv) Initial Tax 
Burden (F=10.179, p-value=0.000), 
d  There are 8 observations for each of 45 states (Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, Wyoming, and Minnesota are excluded, as described in 
Section II of the text). 
e  p-values are reported in parentheses below the 2χ  sample statistic values.  Hypothesis tests for (i) state and (ii) time fixed effects 
reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficients at the 0.001 significance level. 
f  The corresponding null hypothesis is eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ = . 
g  The “state and voter characteristic variables” are ADA Average, Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, 
Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share.  In Equations (A)-(C), the 
corresponding null hypothesis is that these variables are jointly equal to zero.  In Equation (D), the null hypothesis also tests whether 
the respective time interaction effects are jointly equal to zero. 
h  The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 28 interaction effects (cf. Note (c)) are jointly equal to zero.   
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TABLE III 
2SLS Estimation of the Determinants of State Tax Burdens: 1960-2000 
 
VARIABLESa Equation (E)b,c Equation (F)b,d 
Democratic Legislature 0.00320 (2.41) 
0.00382 
(2.84) 
Republican Legislature -0.00062 (-0.40) 
-0.00142 
(-0.94) 
ADA Average -0.00121 (-0.39) 
-0.00187 
(-0.60) 
Log of Real PCPI 0.78064 (0.78) 
-0.33345 
(-0.29) 
Percent Elderly -0.08873 (-1.57) 
-0.07202 
(-1.21) 
Percent Black -0.06888 (-1.82) 
-0.08057 
(-2.01) 
Percent Female 0.02335 (0.82) 
0.05996 
(1.54) 
Percent College-Educated -0.05462 (-2.09) 
-0.03839 
(-1.39) 
Percent Union -0.02187 (-1.02) 
0.01539e 
(-0.63) 
Population Density 0.00839 (4.49) 
0.00265e 
(0.80) 
Farm Share -0.04649 (-1.86) 
-0.04843e 
(-1.54) 
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VARIABLESa Equation (E)b,c Equation (F)b,d 
Manufacturing Share -0.05919 (-2.40) 
-0.02081 
(-0.83) 
Initial Tax Burden 0.46870 (8.52) 
0.44685e 
(5.52) 
Other included variables: Same as Equation (C) in TABLE II 
Same as Equation 
(D) in TABLE II 
Observations Same as Equation (C) in TABLE II 
Same as Equation 
(D) in TABLE II 
Hypothesis Tests:f 
  
Political Party Variablesg 
2χ = 6.240 
(0.012) 
2χ = 11.264 
(0.001) 
State Characteristic Variablesh 
2χ = 36.680 
(0.000) 
2χ = 152.142 
(0.000) 
Interaction Effectsi ---- 
2χ = 100.156 
(0.000) 
 
NOTES:   
a,b,f,g,h,i  See notes a,b,e,f,g, and h in TABLE II, respectively. 
c  The specification of this equation is the same as that of Equation (C) in TABLE II.  The following variables are identified as 
endogenous:  Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, 
Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share.  The corresponding instruments consist of the same variables, but 
measured at the start of the five-year period, as opposed to the 5-year period’s average value.  Equation (E) is just identified.  A 
Hausman test of the endogeneity of Log of Real PCPI rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity with an associated p-value of 0.000.  
A Hausman test of the joint endogeneity of the variables Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, 
Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share rejects the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity with an associated p-value of 0.000.   
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d  The specification of this equation is the same as that of Equation (D) in TABLE II.  The following variables are identified as 
endogenous:  Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, 
Population Density, Farm Share, Manufacturing Share plus all corresponding interaction effects.  Instruments for the state 
characteristic variables consist of the same variables, but measured at the start of the five-year period.  Instruments for interaction 
effects consist of the time-period dummy times the instrument for the respective state characteristic variable.  Equation (F) is just 
identified.   
e  In Equation (F), the variables Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share and Initial Tax Burden are each interacted with the 7 
time period dummy variables, resulting in a total of 28 interaction effects.  Accordingly, the coefficient estimates and t-statistics 
reported in the table represent the effect of the respective variables in the omitted time period (1960-1965).  Hypothesis tests of the 
joint significance of the respective variables over all the time periods produced the following results: (i) Percent Union (F=1.906, p-
value=0.059), (ii) Population Density (F=5.157, p-value=0.000), (iii) Farm Share (F=6.234, p-value=0.000), and (iv) Initial Tax 
Burden (F=10.686, p-value=0.000).  
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TABLE IV 
Regression Results From Adding Governor Effects to Equations (C)-(F) 
 
VARIABLESa,b Equation (C) plus Governor Effectsc 
Equation (D) plus 
Governor Effectsc 
Equation (E) plus 
Governor Effectsc 
Equation (F) plus 
Governor Effectsc 
Democratic Legislature 0.00322 (2.45) 
0.00366 
(2.70) 
0.00300 
(2.22) 
0.00389 
(2.86) 
Republican Legislature 0.00006 (0.42) 
-0.00083 
(-0.57) 
-0.00083 
(-0.53) 
-0.00136 
(-0.89) 
Democratic Governor -0.00049 (-0.58) 
0.00035 
(0.40) 
-0.00080 
(-0.90) 
0.00027 
(0.30) 
Democratic Legislature 0.00358 (2.55) 
0.00371 
(2.68) 
0.00329 
(2.26) 
0.00401 
(2.91) 
Republican Legislature -0.00089 (-0.50) 
-0.00105 
(-0.63) 
-0.00228 
(-1.13) 
-0.00142 
(-0.81) 
Democratic Governor AND  
Democratic Legislature 
-0.00101 
(-0.83) 
-0.00039 
(-0.35) 
-0.00098 
(-0.79) 
-0.00047 
(-0.43) 
Republican Governor AND 
Republican Legislature 
0.00159 
(0.87) 
0.00021 
(0.12) 
0.00254 
(1.23) 
0.00001 
(0.01) 
Hypothesis Test: 
Governor Interaction Effectsd 
2χ = 1.505 
(0.471) 
2χ = 0.137 
(0.934) 
2χ = 2.186 
(0.335) 
2χ = 0.186 
(0.911) 
 
NOTES:   
a,b  See corresponding notes in TABLE II.   
c  In the top part of TABLE IV, each equation includes the same variables as the equation indicated in the respective column heading, 
plus the variable Democratic Governor.  In the bottom part of TABLE IV, each equation includes the same variables as the equation 
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indicated in the respective column heading, plus two additional variables: Democratic Governor and Democratic Legislature, and 
Republican Governor and Republican Legislature.  Like the other political variables, these variables represent the percent of years 
over the respective five-year period for which (i) a Democratic governor was in power, (ii) Democrats controlled both the 
governorship and the legislature, and (iii) Republicans controlled both the governorship and the legislature.    
d  The corresponding null hypothesis is that the coefficients for both Democratic Governor and Democratic Legislature and 
Republican Governor and Republican Legislature are equal to zero.  p-values are reported in parentheses below the 2χ  sample 
statistic values.   
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TABLE V 
The Importance of Controlling for (i) Lagged Effects and (ii) Time-Varying Behavior in Tax Burden 
 
VARIABLESa 
Equation (C) with  
current rather  
than lagged valuesb,c 
 
(1) 
Equation (C) with  
no time fixed effectsb,d 
 
(2) 
Equation (C) with  
a linear time trend rather 
than time fixed effectsb,e 
 
(3) 
    
Democratic Legislature 0.00043 (0.41) 
-0.00010 
(-0.06) 
0.00035 
(0.24) 
Republican Legislature 0.00059 (0.51) 
0.00027 
(0.15) 
0.00042 
(0.24) 
eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic0 ββ:H =  
2χ = 0.014 
(0.905)f 
2χ = 0.051 
(0.822)f 
2χ = 0.002 
(0.965)f 
AIC 1.741 2.012 1.990 
 
NOTES:   
a The full set of results is not reported here for the sake of brevity.  
b,f  See Notes a and e in TABLE II, respectively. 
c The specification of Column (1) differs from Equation (C) in TABLE II in that it uses current values of the state and voter 
characteristic variables rather than the “average value over the respective five-year period, lagged by one year” (cf. Section II of the 
text, “State and Voter Characteristic Variables”).   
d The specification of Column (2) differs from Equation (C) in TABLE II in that it omits time fixed effects.   
e The specification of Column (3) differs from Equation (C) in TABLE II in that it substitutes a linear time trend for the time fixed 
effects. 
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APPENDIX A:   
On the Use of Partisan Control Variables as Instruments 
In Analyses of the Impact of State Policies 
 
Besley and Case (2000) argue that endogeneity is a potentially serious problem in any 
empirical analysis of the consequences of public policy.  To illustrate their point, they 
study the effect of workers’ compensation benefits on average hourly earnings in the 
construction industry.  They note that there may be uncontrolled factors that 
simultaneously influence average hourly earnings and the level of workers’ compensation 
benefits.  As instruments, they propose the fraction of women legislators in state lower 
and upper houses.   Their argument is that, ceteris paribus, women legislators are more 
likely to support worker’s compensation benefits than male legislators.  They report 
success with this instrument and conclude: “One general idea that has heretofore received 
relatively little attention is using political variables as instruments.  We show that this 
idea has some merit (Besley and Case, 2000, p. F689).”  This appendix shows that it is an 
easy stretch to apply the same line of reasoning to the use of party control variables as 
instruments. 
To be effective, an instrument needs to be (i) orthogonal to the error term in the 
policy outcome equation (e.g. hourly earnings equation), but (ii) highly correlated with 
the endogenous policy variable (e.g., workmen’s compensation benefits).  Party control 
of the legislature has good potential to satisfy both conditions. 
With respect to the first condition, it should be noted that legislative control can 
hinge on electoral outcomes in just a few districts.  It is not hard to imagine that the 
salient electoral issues in these districts could be independent (or only weakly dependent) 
of the policy outcome variable.  For example, campaign issues such as the appearance of 
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impropriety in accepting gifts from supporters, draft-dodging during the Vietnam War, or 
the discovery of infidelity in a “family values” candidate, could result in electoral 
outcomes that tip party control of the legislature.  These events would obviously be 
orthogonal to a policy outcome such as “average hourly earnings in the construction 
industry.” 
With respect to the second condition, Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) emphasize 
that an instrument that is only weakly correlated with an endogenous explanatory variable 
will result in IV estimates that are biased in finite samples.  They find that the bias is 
related to 1/F.  They conclude that “examining the F statistic on the excluded instruments 
in the first-stage regression of IV is useful in gauging the finite-sample bias of IV relative 
to OLS….F statistics close to 1 should be cause for concern” (pp. 445-6). 
My results can be seen as providing evidence of the suitability of party control of 
the legislature on this score:  Consider an empirical analysis of the impact of state tax 
policy on an outcome variable like state income or employment.  Suppose that changes in 
state tax policy were endogenous (e.g., states raise/lower taxes during bad/good economic 
times).  In this context, Equations (C) through (F) can be thought of as first-stage 
regressions in a two-stage IV procedure.  The sample F-statistics corresponding to the 
joint hypothesis 0β 0β eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic == ,  range from 4.0 to 6.6.  In other 
words, by the criterion identified by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), these two political 
variables could serve as useful instruments to reduce endogeneity bias. 
If this is true for state tax policy, it may also be true for other state policies.  
Moreover, if party control of the legislature were more highly correlated with the policy 
variable than fraction of women legislators, it could make an even better instrument than 
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the one proposed by Besley and Case (2000).  This is a potentially fruitful topic for future 
research. 
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APPENDIX B:   
Estimation of Political Party Effects Using Alternative Specifications 
 
This appendix reports the results of an investigation into the factors that influence the 
empirical finding of political party effects.  The following four factors are examined for 
their impact on estimates of political party effects: 
1. The use of five-year interval data versus annual data.  
2. The use of lagged versus current values of the state and voter characteristic 
variables. 
 
3. The inclusion of Initial Tax Burden as an explanatory variable. 
4. The inclusion of different controls for the influence of time trend effects. 
TABLE I-A reports the results of my investigation. 
 The top part of the table reports regression results using five-year interval data 
(360 observations).  The bottom part of the table is based on annual data from 1961-2000 
(1800 observations).  Only the coefficients for the partisan control variables Democratic 
Legislature and Republican Legislature are reported in the table, along with a test of the 
hypothesis that eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ =  and the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) value to compare goodness-of-fit across specifications. 
 The first column in the table reports the results of equations that are specified to 
closely resemble Equation (C) in TABLE II of the text (cf. description of specifications 
in the notes below TABLE I-A).  Equation (A1) uses five-year interval data, whereas 
Equation (A5) uses annual data.  Note that both equations reject the hypothesis of no 
difference in the political parties at the 5-percent significance level.  While the coefficient 
values are smaller in Equation (A5), this is misleading because this equation estimates the 
one-year impact of party control of the legislature.  The estimates in Equation (A1) 
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measure five-year impacts.  To make the estimates comparable, one should multiply the 
estimates in Equation (A5) by 5.  It is easy to verify that the estimates based on annual 
data imply a larger partisan control effect.  I conclude that my finding of a partisan 
control effect is not dependent on my use of five-year interval data.  If anything, annual 
data would produce a larger estimated effect. 
 The second column in TABLE I-A investigates the impact of using current versus 
lagged values of the state and voter characteristic variables.  As discussed in the text (cf. 
Section II, “State and Voter Characteristic Variables”), tax legislation passed in one year 
does not get reflected in revenues until, at least, the next fiscal year.  It turns out that 
ignoring this lag between legislation and actual revenues can cause one to fail to estimate 
a partisan control effect. 
 The specification of the equations in the second column (Equations [A2] and 
[A6]) is identical to that of the equations in the first column (Equations [A1] and [A5], 
respectively), except that lagged values of the state and voter characteristic variables are 
replaced with current values.  When I use five-year interval data, this replacement results 
in a failure to reject the hypothesis of no party effect:  The p-value associated with the 
test of the hypothesis eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ =  is 0.905 in Equation (A2) versus 
0.047 in Equation (A1).  The impact is less drastic using annual data, but the result is the 
same.  Substituting current values for lagged values causes one to fail to reject the 
hypothesis eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ =  at the 5-percent level (cf. Equation [A6], 
the associated p-value is 0.113).  This highlights the importance of appropriately 
controlling for the lag between legislation and revenues. 
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 The third column reports the effects associated with omitting the Initial Tax 
Burden variable from the specifications of Equations (A1) and (A5).  A comparison of 
Equation (A3) with Equation (A1), and Equation (A7) with Equation (A5) demonstrates 
that the associated effects are generally small, and can cut both ways with respect to 
estimating the influence of political parties.  When using five-year interval data, the p-
value associated with the hypothesis test of no party effect rises to 0.098 from 0.047.  In 
contrast, the p-value based on annual data falls to 0.001 from 0.047.  The AIC values 
associated with Equations (A3) and (A7) are substantially larger than their counterpart 
values in Equations (A1) and (A5), respectively.  I conclude from this that the effects of 
omitting Initial Tax Burden are generally unclear, but the AIC values clearly indicate that 
Initial Tax Burden belongs in the specification. 
 The last column of TABLE I-A investigates the impact of using different controls 
to hold constant the influence of time effects.  As discussed in the text (cf. Section II, 
“State and Time Fixed Effects”), state Tax Burdens exhibited strong cyclical behavior 
over the sample period (cf. Figure 1-A).  Therefore, it is important to control for the 
effect of omitted, time-varying variables.  This is especially true when the specification 
includes state fixed effects, and changes in political party control of the legislature occur 
unevenly over time and across states. 
 Equations (A4) and (A8) are identical to their counterparts, Equations (A1) and 
(A5) respectively, except that the time fixed effects are replaced with a linear time trend.  
This has a substantial impact on tests of no party effects:  Using five-year interval data, 
the effect of using a linear time trend is to cause the p-value associated with the test of the 
hypothesis, eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ = , to increase to 0.965 from 0.047.  The 
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corresponding p-value based on annual data increases to 0.967 from 0.047.  A 
comparison of the AIC values across equations indicates that a linear time trend variable 
does a poor job of capturing time-varying behavior in the dependent variable.   
 In summary, my investigation produces the following conclusions: 
1. Failure to take into account the lag between legislation and revenues can cause 
one to fail to find evidence of political party influences on taxes. 
 
2. Failure to properly model time-varying behavior in the dependent variable can 
also cause one to fail to find evidence of political party influences on taxes. 
 
3. The effect of omitting Initial Tax Burden is unclear, but the evidence indicates 
that this variable belongs in a regression equation that seeks to explain state Tax 
Burdens. 
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TABLE I-A 
Investigating the Effects of Alternative Specifications 
 
FIVE-YEAR INTERVAL DATAa Equation (A1) Equation (A2) Equation (A3) Equation (A4) 
     
Democratic Legislature 0.00326 (2.55) 
0.00043 
(0.41) 
0.00236 
(1.78) 
0.00035 
(0.24) 
Republican Legislature 0.00036 (0.24) 
0.00059 
(0.51) 
-0.00029 
(-0.17) 
0.00042 
(0.24) 
eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic0 ββ:H =
2χ = 3.961 
(p-value = 0.047) 
2χ = 0.014 
(p-value = 0.905) 
2χ = 2.730 
(p-value = 0.098) 
2χ = 0.002 
(p-value = 0.965) 
Observations 360 360 360 360 
AIC 1.698 1.741 1.924 1.990 
     
ANNUAL DATAb Equation (A5) Equation (A6) Equation (A7) Equation (A8) 
     
Democratic Legislature 0.00102 (3.24) 
0.00056 
(1.67) 
0.00108 
(2.32) 
0.00036 
(1.00) 
Republican Legislature 0.00023 (0.60) 
-0.00009 
(-0.25) 
-0.00077 
(-1.48) 
0.00038 
(0.89) 
eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic0 ββ:H =
2χ = 3.953 
(p-value = 0.047) 
2χ = 2.506 
(p-value = 0.113) 
2χ = 10.203 
(p-value = 0.001) 
2χ = 0.002 
(p-value = 0.967) 
Observations 1800 1800 1800 1800 
AIC 0.936 0.992 1.752 1.200 
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NOTE:  The full set of results is not reported here for the sake of brevity.  The specifications of the respective equations are described 
in the notes below.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  All hypothesis tests employ White’s 
heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix in calculating sample statistics. 
 
a  The top part of the table uses five-year interval data.  The specification of Equation (A1) is identical to that of Equation (C) in the 
text, except that the variable ADA Average has been omitted to make the specification more compatible with those that follow.  The 
specification of Equation (A2) is identical to that of Equation (A1), except it uses current values of the state and voter characteristic 
variables, rather than the “average value over the respective five-year period, lagged by one year” (cf. Section II of the text, “State 
and Voter Characteristic Variables”).  The specification of Equation (A3) is also identical to that of Equation (A1), except it omits 
Initial Tax Burden as an explanatory variable.  Finally, the specification of Equation (A4) is identical to that of Equation (A1) except 
that it replaces the time fixed effects with a linear time trend variable.   
b  The bottom part of the table uses annual, state-level data for the period 1961-2000.  The specification of Equation (A5) is intended 
to be the “annual-equivalent” of Equation (C) in the text, though it also omits ADA Average, as discussed above.  State and voter 
characteristic variables are lagged by one year.  For Initial Tax Burden, I use the one-year lagged value of Tax Burden.  Annual time 
fixed effects are used to capture the influence of omitted, time-varying variables.  The specification of Equation (A6) is identical to 
that of Equation (A5), except it uses current values of the state and voter characteristic variables, rather than one-year lagged values.  
The specification of Equation (A7) is also identical to that of Equation (A5), except it omits Initial Tax Burden as an explanatory 
variable.  Finally, the specification of Equation (A8) is identical to that of Equation (A5) except that it replaces the annual time fixed 
effects with a linear time trend variable.   
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FIGURE 1-A 
Average State Tax Burden for U.S.: 1960-1999 
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APPENDIX C: 
Results of Re-estimating Equations (E) and (F)  
When Log of Real PCPI Is the Only Endogenous Variable 
 
The text reports that :0H Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, 
Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing 
Share are all exogenous is soundly rejected (the associated p-value is 0.0004).  It is possible that 
this result is driven by the endogeneity of Log of Real PCPI, with the other variables being 
exogenous (a test of :0H Log of Real PCPI is exogenous is rejected at a level below 0.0001).  
Accordingly, this Appendix re-estimates the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) results reported in 
the text, this time assuming that Log of Real PCPI is the only endogenous variable. 
 TABLE II-A repeats the analysis of TABLE III in the text.  The only difference is that 
the variables Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent College-Educated, 
Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share are assumed to be 
exogenous in TABLE II-A.  The main results of the analysis are unchanged.  In particular, the 
null hypothesis eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ =  is convincingly rejected in TABLE II-A, just 
as it is in TABLE III. 
 TABLE III-A re-estimates the last two columns of TABLE IV in the text.  These last two 
columns add variables for party control of the governorship to Equations (E) and (F) of TABLE 
III.  The re-estimated equations add the same executive branch variables to the 2SLS 
specifications of TABLE II-A.  Again, the main results are unchanged:  all specifications find 
that the gubernatorial coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. 
 In conclusion, all the key results of this study with respect to the effect of partisan control 
variables are unchanged when it is assumed that the only endogenous variable is Log of Real 
PCPI. 
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TABLE II-A 
2SLS Estimation of the Determinants of State Tax Burdens: 1960-2000  
(Assuming Log of Real PCPI Is the Only Endogenous Variable) 
 
VARIABLESa Equation (E)b,c Equation (F)b,d 
Democratic Legislature 0.00331 (2.53) 
0.00353 
(2.62) 
Republican Legislature 0.00010 (0.07) 
-0.00087 
(-0.59) 
ADA Average -0.00221 (-0.74) 
-0.00120 
(-0.39) 
Log of Real PCPI -0.61518 (-0.75) 
0.01350 
(0.01) 
Percent Elderly -0.08692 (-1.70) 
-0.07594 
(-1.37) 
Percent Black -0.06403 (-2.00) 
-0.05457 
(-1.56) 
Percent Female 0.02492 (1.33) 
0.04386 
(1.81) 
Percent College-Educated -0.05486 (-2.46) 
-0.04974 
(-2.08) 
Percent Union 0.00667 (0.42) 
-0.00424e 
(-0.24) 
Population Density 0.00735 (4.07) 
0.00206e 
(0.66) 
Farm Share -0.07446 (-2.64) 
-0.02565e 
(-0.91) 
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VARIABLESa Equation (E)b,c Equation (F)b,d 
Manufacturing Share -0.08566 (-3.97) 
-0.02706 
(-1.23) 
Initial Tax Burden 0.45517 (8.56) 
0.42949e 
(5.44) 
Other included variables: Same as Equation (E) in TABLE III 
Same as Equation 
(F) in TABLE III 
Observations Same as Equation (E) in TABLE III 
Same as Equation 
(F) in TABLE III 
Hypothesis Tests: 
  
Political Party Variablesf 
2χ = 4.873 
(p-value = 0.027) 
2χ = 8.703 
(p-value = 0.003) 
State Characteristic Variablesg 
2χ = 39.713 
(p-value = 0.000) 
2χ = 165.889 
(p-value = 0.000) 
State Fixed Effectsh 
2χ = 144.562 
(p-value = 0.000) 
2χ = 136.516 
(p-value = 0.000) 
Time Effectsi 
2χ = 124.106 
(p-value = 0.000) 
2χ = 256.835 
(p-value = 0.000) 
Interaction Effectsj ---- 
2χ = 108.894 
(p-value = 0.000) 
 
NOTES:   
a  Variables are described in Section II of the text.  Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in TABLE I.   
b  t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  All hypothesis tests employ White’s heteroscedastic 
consistent covariance matrix in calculating sample statistics. 
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c  The specification of this equation is the same as that of Equation (C) in TABLE II.  The following variables are identified as 
endogenous:  Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, 
Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share.  The corresponding instruments consist of the same variables, but 
measured at the start of the five-year period, as opposed to the 5-year period’s average value.  Equation (E) is just identified.  A 
Hausman test of the endogeneity of Log of Real PCPI rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity with an associated p-value of 0.000.  
A Hausman test of the joint endogeneity of the variables Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, 
Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share rejects the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity with an associated p-value of 0.000.   
d  The specification of this equation is the same as that of Equation (D) in TABLE II.  The following variables are identified as 
endogenous:  Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent College-Educated, Percent Union, 
Population Density, Farm Share, Manufacturing Share plus all corresponding interaction effects.  Instruments for the state 
characteristic variables consist of the same variables, but measured at the start of the five-year period.  Instruments for interaction 
effects consist of the time-period dummy times the instrument for the respective state characteristic variable.  Equation (F) is just 
identified.   
e  In Equation (F), the variables Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share and Initial Tax Burden are each interacted with the 7 
time period dummy variables, resulting in a total of 28 interaction effects.  Accordingly, the coefficient estimates and t-statistics 
reported in the table represent the effect of the respective variables in the omitted time period (1960-1965).   
f  The corresponding null hypothesis is eLegislatur RepublicaneLegislatur Democratic ββ = . 
g  The “state characteristic variables” are ADA Average, Log of Real PCPI, Percent Elderly, Percent Black, Percent Female, Percent 
College-Educated, Percent Union, Population Density, Farm Share, and Manufacturing Share.  In Equation (E), the corresponding 
null hypothesis is that these variables are jointly equal to zero.  In Equation (F), the null hypothesis also tests whether the associated 
time interaction effects are jointly equal to zero.  
h  The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 44 state fixed effects are jointly equal to zero. 
i  In Equation (E), the corresponding null hypothesis is that the 7 time-period fixed effects are jointly equal to zero.  In Equation (F), 
the null hypothesis also tests whether the time interaction effects are jointly equal to zero. 
 j  The corresponding null hypothesis is that the 28 interaction effects (cf. Note (e)) are jointly equal to zero.   
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TABLE III-A 
Regression Results From Adding Governor Effects to Equations (E) and (F) of TABLE II-A 
(Assuming Log of Real PCPI Is the Only Endogenous Variable) 
 
VARIABLESa Equation (E) plus Governor Effectsb 
Equation (F) plus 
Governor Effectsb 
   
Democratic Legislature 0.00318 (2.41) 
0.00358 
(2.63) 
Republican Legislature -0.00004 (-0.03) 
-0.00081 
(-0.56) 
Democratic Governor -0.00053 (-0.63) 
0.00024 
(0.27) 
   
   
Democratic Legislature 0.00348 (2.46) 
0.00367 
(2.67) 
Republican Legislature -0.00115 (-0.64) 
-0.00113 
(-0.67) 
Democratic Governor AND  
Democratic Legislature 
-0.00092 
(-0.77) 
-0.00045 
(-0.41) 
Republican Governor AND 
Republican Legislature 
0.00184 
(0.99) 
0.00041 
(0.23) 
   
Hypothesis Test: 
Governor Interaction Effectsc 
2χ = 1.633 
(p-value = 0.442) 
2χ = 0.215 
(p-value = 0.898) 
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Notes:   
 
a  Variables are described in Section II of the text.  Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in TABLE I.   
b  In the top part of TABLE IV, each equation includes the same variables as the equation indicated in the respective column heading, 
plus the variable Democratic Governor.  In the bottom part of TABLE IV, each equation includes the same variables as the equation 
indicated in the respective column heading, plus two additional variables: Democratic Governor and Democratic Legislature, and 
Republican Governor and Republican Legislature.  Like the other political variables, these variables represent the percent of years 
over the respective five-year period for which (i) a Democratic governor was in power, (ii) Democrats controlled both the 
governorship and the legislature, and (iii) Republicans controlled both the governorship and the legislature.   t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  All hypothesis tests employ White’s heteroscedastic consistent covariance matrix in 
calculating sample statistics. 
c  The corresponding null hypothesis is that the coefficients for both Democratic Governor and Democratic Legislature and 
Republican Governor and Republican Legislature are equal to zero. 
 
  
